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INTRODUCTION 
The cornerstone of the American patent law system is to 
encourage technological innovation by financially rewarding 
inventors for the full disclosure of their ideas.1  By enacting Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, the Framers envisioned a 
system that “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”2  
The astounding advancements in many areas of technology show that 
their vision became a reality.  With these few words, Congress faced 
the challenging task of establishing a system that encourages 
ingenuity and rewards innovation, while conferring a useful benefit 
to society as a whole. 
Over two hundred years later, patent legislation has evolved into 
a complex, carefully constructed statutory scheme that is 
indispensable for sustaining research efforts in both the public and 
private sectors.3  To maintain integrity in the system, Congress 
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 1 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1 (2001).  The actual right 
awarded to a patent holder is the right to exclude others from “making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention” in the United States.  See infra text 
accompanying note 97.  This in turn often results in financial gain through the 
licensing or assignment of these rights to others.  See generally CHISUM, supra, at 2-6; 
see also Kevin C. Hooper, Utility and Non-operability Standards in Biotechnology Patent 
Prosecution: CAFC Precedent Versus PTO Practice, 36 IDEA 203, 206 (1996) (“In theory, 
[the patent system] . . . is a quid pro quo method used by the government to 
encourage early and complete disclosure of inventions that meet the statutory 
criteria for patentability.”). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3 See Hooper, supra note 1, at 203-04 (explaining that patent protection is an 
 128 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:127 
developed requirements that an invention must satisfy in order to 
receive patent protection.4  In particular, the invention must be 
novel,5 nonobvious,6 and useful.7  As patent law attempts to keep pace 
with rapid developments in technology, the meaning of these 
seemingly simple concepts is often imbued with uncertainty. 
The Human Genome Project,8 for example, reveals valuable 
information about genes that are involved in life-threatening diseases 
and other genetic disorders.  Such a database of information is fertile 
ground for raising highly complex patent law issues.  Private and 
public entities are already taking advantage of this information by 
filing patent applications for full or partial length gene sequences.9  
In response, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)10 recently 
issued new Utility Examination Guidelines (“Guidelines”) that 
purport to aid Examiners as they review applications claiming gene 
sequences.11  Under these new Guidelines, the claimed invention 
must have “specific, substantial, and credible” utility.12  The reasoning 
behind issuing the new Guidelines is clear—to ensure patents are not 
 
important factor toward the ultimate success in the biotechnology industry, because 
most companies cannot afford the monetary risks required to develop commercially 
useful products without such protection).  Furthermore, patent protection is also 
critical to secure investments from venture capitalists in order to create start-up 
companies that develop promising technologies in the market place.  Id. at 205. 
 4 An invention must satisfy several requirements in order to be deemed 
patentable.  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (1994); see also Nathan Machin, 
Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent 
Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (1999) (describing six requirements for patentability 
as patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, a timely filed patent application, 
nonobviousness, and a description of “the best method of making or using the 
invention so as to enable one or ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention”).  
Although an invention must meet all of these requirements, this Comment will only 
address patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.  For a 
detailed discussion of the written description requirement, see Lisa A. Karczewski, 
Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications: The Implications of USPTO Written Description 
Requirement Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1060-64 
(2000). 
 5 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001). 
 6 Id. at § 103. 
 7 Id. at § 101. 
 8 See infra note 38. 
 9 G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome 
Project, 22 AIPLA Q. J. 27, 50 (1994) (describing the increase in patent applications 
after the NIH’s initial applications for cDNA fragments). 
 10 The PTO is the agency within the United States Department of Commerce 
responsible for granting and issuing patents, as well as registering trademarks.  35 
U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 2(a)(1) (2001). 
 11 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter 
Utility Examination Guidelines I]. 
 12 Id. 
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granted for gene sequences that do not possess substantial utility.13  
The question remains, however, whether the PTO acted within its 
authority in issuing the new Guidelines.  The PTO is bound by 
congressional intent and judicial interpretation of the meaning of 
“utility.”14  While the modern judicial trend reflects a more relaxed 
standard for utility, the PTO’s heightened utility standard may be the 
subject of legal challenges as PTO Examiners continue to reject 
claims for truly patentable inventions based on alleged lack of utility. 
This Comment will examine the interplay between the PTO’s 
revised Guidelines that pertain to patent applications for human 
genes, and the legal basis behind the utility requirements for 
patentability.  Part I will explain the scientific background regarding 
genes and their functions.  Part II will give an overview of the 
American patent system.  Focusing on the utility requirement for 
patents, this section also traces relevant case law dealing with the 
legal construction of the concept of “utility.”  Part III will discuss the 
proliferation of patent applications for human gene sequences and 
the PTO’s response.  This section will also explore the practical effect 
of the new Guidelines by reviewing actual claim rejections that the 
PTO issued under section 101.15  Part IV will discuss the implications 
of the PTO’s actions and the legal challenges the PTO may face by 
raising the utility requirement “hurdle,” specifically for gene patents.  
This Part suggests that the PTO replace the revised Guidelines with a 
methodology that is defined by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brenner 
v. Manson,16 which focused on the utility requirement for 
patentability, the legislative history of the utility doctrine, and the 
Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) most 
recent articulation of the utility standard. 
 
 13 See M. Scott McBride, Comment, Patentability of Human Genes: Our Patent System 
Can Address the Issues Without Modification, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 532 (2001) (“[The] 
new [utility] standard is likely to protect researchers performing bona fide research 
on particular genes against those who patent ESTs to lay claim to those genes of 
which they have no knowledge.”). 
 14 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 127, 138-41 (describing the role of the PTO). 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
 16 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
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I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO GENES 
A.  The Fundamentals of Molecular Biology 
To understand the legal issues surrounding the patentability of 
human genes, it is important to have a basic understanding of 
molecular genetics.  The human body, complete with physical traits 
and characteristics, represents the final product of a series of 
complex biochemical functions that occur at the cellular level.  Genes 
are the functional units of heredity.  They are composed of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), the molecule possessing functional 
properties that earn its distinction as the cell’s master molecule.17  
DNA indirectly codes or dictates the structures of molecules that are 
made by proteins, including sugars and fats.18  DNA not only governs 
the structure, but also the timing and quantity of the molecule’s 
synthesis.19 
The individual building blocks, or nucleotides, that comprise 
DNA consist of a phosphate group, a deoxyribose sugar, and one of 
the four nitrogen bases known as adenine, cytosine, guanine, and 
thymine.20  These bases link together, in a particular order, to create 
a specific gene.21  The DNA molecule typically has from 3000 to 
several million nucleotide units arranged in a double helix.22  The 
helix consists of two chains of alternating phosphate and deoxyribose 
units in continuous linkages.23  The nitrogen bases project inwardly 
toward the axis of the helix.24  Adenine always unites with thymine, 
and cytosine with guanine.25  The sequences of the bases on the chain 
vary with the individual, and it is this sequence that expresses the 
genetic code.26 
After a complex series of events called transcription27 and 
 
 17 HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY  9-10 (3d ed. 1995). 
 18 DNA “indirectly” codes for proteins because DNA is first transcribed into 
another nucleic acid, RNA, which then is translated into protein.  Id. at 10, 12. 
 19 Id. at 10. 
 20 Id. at 102-05. 
 21 Id. at 4. 
 22 Id. at 104-05. 
 23 LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 104-05. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 102. 
 27 During transcription, one strand of DNA is used as a template to create a 
complementary RNA, or more specifically, messenger RNA (“mRNA”).  See generally 
id. at 119, G-12. 
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translation,28 the gene ultimately creates specific proteins that 
execute the program of cellular activities for which the gene 
encodes.29  Proteins, or the “working molecules” of a cell, are 
responsible for the basic biological functions of living organisms.30  In 
addition to building and maintaining the structure of the cell and its 
organelles,31 proteins catalyze many intracellular and extracellular 
chemical reactions that are vitally intertwined in the physiology of 
cells.  Proteins make cells move, perform work, and direct synthesis of 
other proteins and molecules.32  They determine cell constitution 
and function and move molecules across membranes.33  Given their 
central role in the complicated orchestration of cellular events, 
proteins are fundamental to the biology of life. 
Because of the devastating effects that could result from a single 
mistake during these cellular events, many scientists and researchers 
devote countless hours toward understanding biochemical processes.  
A single mutation or deviation in the gene sequence has the potential 
of creating a new protein that can result in a life-threatening disease, 
rather than the healthy function encoded by the original genetic 
sequence.34  For example, because of gene mutations, a person 
diagnosed with phenylketonuria is incapable of digesting a dietary 
constituent.35  Another example of a genetic mutation may result in a 
dysfunctional molecule that normally helps to organize the inside of 
a muscle cell.36  Instead of a healthy muscle, the disease of muscular 
dystrophy would devastate the individual.37  Thus, there is a 
compelling need to understand the biochemical processes at the 
cellular level, because they are the starting point of many disorders 
and diseases that affect so many human lives. 
A genome is the entire genetic makeup of an organism.  A 
bacterium’s genome consists of approximately six hundred thousand 
DNA base pairs, in contrast to the human and mouse genome which 
 
 28 Translation refers to the phase of protein synthesis when the mRNA encodes 
the amino acid sequence that determines the protein to be made.  See generally id. at 
120. 
 29 LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 51. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Organelles are the membrane-limited structures found within a cell’s 
cytoplasm, including mitochondria, lysosomes, and golgi bodies.  See id. at 8-9. 
 32 Id. at 9, 119-38. 
 33 Id. at 9. 
 34 Id. 
 35 LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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consists of about three billion DNA base pairs.38  Considering the vast 
differences in complexity between the bacterium and human species, 
the large discrepancy in the number of base pairs is not surprising.  
Rather, the difference illustrates the governing role genes play in the 
evolution of living organisms.  Despite the large number of available 
base pairs in the human genome, only two to five percent of the 
genome encodes protein.39  The non-coding regions of the DNA 
serve other functions such as regulating gene expression.40 
B.  The Human Genome Project 
The Human Genome Project41 — initiated by the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) 
— is a worldwide coordinated effort to sequence the entire human 
genome and to catalog its estimated 100,000 genes found in the 
human chromosomes.42  Originally designed to be a thirteen-year 
project, advances in biotechnology and laboratory techniques 
substantially shortened the estimated time for completion.43  In the 
year 2000, it was predicted that the entire human genome sequence 
would be completed within four to six years.44  Thus far, researchers 
have collected vast amounts of genetic information.  A method for 
gene identification, known as complementary DNA (“cDNA”) 
sequencing, now quickly and easily identifies genes.45 In 1991, Dr. 
 
 38 Human Genome Project Information Website, The Science Behind the Human 
Genome Project: Basic Genetics, Genome Draft Sequence, and Post-Genome Science, at 
http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/info.html (last modified May 6, 2002) (on file 
with author). 
 39 Andrew T. Knight, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility 
Guidelines In Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1003 (1998). 
 40 Andrew G. Clark, The Search for Meaning in Noncoding DNA, available at 
http://www.linkage.rockefeller.edu/wli/dna_corr/clark01.pdf (last visited Jul. 28, 
2002) (on file with author). 
 41 See Human Genome Project Information Website, About the Human Genome 
Project, at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/about.html (last modified July 26, 
2001) (on file with author). 
 42 See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural 
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 115 (2001); see also 
Joseph P. Pieroni, The Patentability of Expressed Sequence Tags, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 403 
(2000); John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689-90 (1998). 
 43 See Golden, supra note 42, at 115 (noting that these advances have eased much 
of the process of isolating, identifying, and sequencing genes by “substantially 
routinizing a variety of tasks that had previously required considerable effort and 
ingenuity”). 
 44 See Pieroni, supra note 42, at 403. 
 45 See Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags and 
Human Genome Project, 252 SCIENCE 1651 (1991) (describing technique for identifying 
expressed sequence tags); see also Knight, supra note 39, at 1003. 
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Craig Venter and his associates at the NIH developed this approach.46  
The process involves cDNA sequences which are “edited” copies of a 
gene, rather than the full-length genomic DNA sequence.47  The 
shorter sequences, which only contain protein-coding regions, allow 
for quicker identification and characterization of genes.48  The 
widespread use of cDNA sequencing identified approximately 50,000 
human genes as of September 1995.49 
On June 25, 2000, President Clinton announced that researchers 
sequenced the human genome in its entirety.50  The Human Genome 
Project and Celera Genomics Corporation, a privately funded 
company which set forth a “rough draft” of the human genome, 
accomplished this historic achievement.51  Although sequencing the 
entire human genome is a landmark achievement in and of itself, the 
real challenges facing scientists — including understanding the gene 
and protein functions — remain ahead.52  Elucidating the DNA 
sequence alone does not provide researchers with much information 
on how to develop treatments or cure diseases.53  This can only be 
accomplished by understanding the biological functions which 
correspond to the newly identified genes.54  Thus, the focus for 
researchers in the years to come will shift away from the genetic 
blueprint of the human genome itself, and move toward the protein 
functions encoded by the genes. 
 
 46 See Pieroni, supra note 42, at 401. 
 47 See Knight, supra note 39, at 1003 (noting that these shorter sequences can be 
characterized more rapidly than longer genomic sequences). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1004. 
 50 See Human Genome Project Information Website, White House Press Release, 
President Clinton Announces the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome, 
available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/clinton1.html (last modified Feb. 
28, 2001) (on file with author). 
 51 See Golden, supra note 42, at 115. 
 52 The process of cDNA sequencing received much criticism from eminent 
members of the field.  One critic in particular was James Watson who, along with 
Francis Crick, determined the double-helical structure of DNA.  When Watson 
commented on the NIH’s patent applications for certain gene sequences, he noted 
“that ‘virtually any monkey’ can run an automated sequencing machine,” and that 
the real importance lies in the interpretation of the sequence.  See Knight, supra note 
39, at 1004. 
 53 Dr. Venter analogized this information to “getting a list of phone numbers for 
a certain city with no names attached,” and argued that a cDNA sequence alone does 
not tell a researcher what the sequence does “unless it’s a sequence from a gene 
whose function is already known.” Id. 
 54 Id. 
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C.  Recombinant DNA Technology Allows for Genetic Analysis 
Recombinant DNA technology allows researchers to unlock the 
mystery behind DNA and protein functions.55  In the 1970s, technical 
advances in laboratory techniques led to breakthroughs in molecular 
biology.56  Recombinant DNA technology allows scientists to purify a 
specific gene, determine its sequence and explore it functional 
regions.57  This form of genetic engineering is accomplished through 
the manipulation and cloning of DNA.58  A particular enzyme, called 
a restrictive enzyme, cleaves the DNA at specific sequences and yields 
a reproducible set of fragments.59  These DNA fragments insert into a 
vector DNA molecule60 which has the ability to replicate when it is 
inserted into a host cell.61  The DNA fragment of interest along with 
the vector molecule form what is known as the recombinant DNA.62  
The recombinant DNA enters into host cells, which are most often 
bacterial cells.63  Under appropriate conditions, bacterial cells 
replicate exponentially and yield large numbers of the recombinant 
DNA molecules.64  Once the desired sequence is cloned and cleaved, 
the fragment of interest can be isolated and analyzed, thus providing 
large quantities of the gene at scientists’ disposal.65 
D.  Expressed Sequence Tags 
Given the central role that Expressed Sequence Tags (“EST”) 
played in shaping the new Guidelines, it is helpful to have a basic 
understanding of the meaning of ESTs.66  At any given time during 
the life of a cell, only a subset of genes within an entire genome is 
active.67  The genes that are being expressed have been transcribed 
 
 55 See LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 221. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 222. 
 58 See id. at 221-25. 
 59 Id. at 221. 
 60 Bacterial plasmids are commonly used as cloning vectors.  Id. at 222.  These are 
small, circular extrachromosomal DNA molecules that replicate autonomously in a 
bacterial cell.  Id. 
 61 LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 222. 
 62 Id. at 221-22. 
 63 Id. at 221. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 240. 
 66 For additional background information on ESTs, see Machin, supra note 4, at 
434-35. 
 67 Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and 
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 
748 (2000). 
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from DNA and take the form of mRNA within the cell.68  Scientists 
can survey the active genes of a cell by extracting mRNA, converting 
it to cDNA, and sequencing it.69  ESTs are essentially a short length70 
of the cDNA that represent part of a gene that was being expressed at 
that given time.71  Thus, ESTs are not individually selected, but result 
from a random selection.72  Because ESTs are only a fraction of the 
gene to which they correspond, ESTs do not provide much useful 
information regarding the full extent of a gene’s functions.73  ESTs, 
however, can be useful for isolating full-length genes, or for marking 
coding regions of genomic DNA sequences.74  Beyond these primarily 
intermediate functions, ESTs do not play a significant part in the 
quest for understanding the true nature of gene and protein 
functions.75 
II.  THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 
A.  Foundation and Development of the Current Patent System 
The United States Constitution embodies the source of federal 
patent legislation.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, grants Congress the 
exclusive power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”76  In the 
interest of developing a uniform system of law governing patents and 
copyrights, this provision of the Constitution earned the approval of 
the Framers without debate.77  The Framers clearly recognized the 
necessity of such a system in light of the increased rate of 
industrialization and the potential interstate conflicts that were to 
inevitably occur as a result of the dissimilarities in state patent 
 
 68 Id.  For the definition of mRNA, see supra note 27. 
 69 Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 748. 
 70 ESTs are generally 400-500 nucleotides in length, compared to full-length 
genes which are generally 2,000 to 25,000 nucleotides in length.  Id. at 749. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 750; see also Leora Ben-Ami et al., Biotech 
Patent Law Developments, 573 PLI/PAT 555, 558 (1999). 
 74 Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 749. 
 75 Id. at 749-50; see also Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 558. 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 77 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17; see also Charles C. Wong, State Immunity 
Doctrine: Demoting the Patent System, 53 ME. L. REV. 111, 117-20 (2001) (discussing the 
evolution of the federal patent law system beginning with the constitutional grant for 
the enactment of patent legislation). 
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customs.78  Thus, following the proposal of this provision, the power 
to enact patent legislation became one of the enumerated powers of 
Congress on September 5, 1787.79 
Congress passed the first patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790, 
on April 10, 1790.80  The Act authorized the granting of patents for 
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein not before known or used.”81  The Act also 
created a patent board, rather than a patent office, that was 
responsible for examining patent applications.82  In response to the 
workload that proved to be burdensome for a three-member panel, a 
registration system was implemented with the promulgation of the 
1793 Patent Act.83  The registration system lasted for forty-three years, 
until Congress enacted the 1836 Patent Act, which is known as “the 
foundation of the modern patent system in the United States.”84  One 
of the major changes under the revised Patent Act included the 
reimplementation of the examination requirement, namely that the 
application be examined for utility and novelty.85  In 1850, the 
Supreme Court established an additional patentability requirement 
in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,86 the “flash of genius” standard, which much 
later evolved into the nonobviousness requirement.87  The patent 
code was again revised in 1870.88  This revision imposed the 
requirement that the patent applicant define his invention with more 
clarity by focusing on the patent’s claims.89 
Patent law underwent a major statutory revision in 1952.90  
Congress drafted the 1952 Act in response to an “anti-patent fervor” 
 
 78 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16; see also Wong, supra note 77, at 118 
(describing the Patent Clause as “both a grant of power and a limitation” with the 
specific objective of encouraging innovation, while avoiding monopolies that would 
stifle competition). 
 79 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. 
 80 Id. at 18. 
 81 Id. (quotations in original). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 19. 
 84 Id. 
 85 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.  Additionally, the 1836 Patent Act 
designated the Patent Office as a separate bureau of the Department of State, 
created the office of the Commissioner of Patents, created the patent numbering 
system, and also allowed for an applicant to appeal to a three member board if his 
application was rejected.  Id. at 20-21. 
 86 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
 87 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 20. 
 88 Id. at 21. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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that was developing in the Supreme Court.91  The 1952 Patent Act, 
which serves as the current patent legislation codified under Title 35 
of the United States Code, 92 strengthened the patent system with 
respect to patentability and infringement issues.93  In 1982, Congress 
established the Federal Circuit and vested in it exclusive jurisdiction 
over patent appeals.94  Prior to 1982, the regional circuits heard 
patent appeals and issued disparate standards for patentability.95  The 
Federal Circuit now provides a single forum to uniformly interpret 
the patent law on appeal, giving new force and validity to the patent 
law system in the United States.96 
B.  Patentable Subject Matter and § 112 Requirements 
A patent confers upon the patent holder “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
 
 91 Id. at 21-22.  Between 1890 and 1930, the Court looked favorably at the patent 
system.  This changed from 1930 to 1950, when the Court began to view the granting 
of patents with suspicion, largely because of the monopolistic nature of patents.  Id. 
at 21.  This negative outlook manifested in several Supreme Court decisions.  For 
example, the Court’s decision in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 
U.S. 661 (1944), expanded the doctrine of patent misuse.  In Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946), the Court invalidated the practice of 
“means plus function” claim drafting.  Additionally, the Court required synergism for 
the patentability of combination patents in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equipment Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 21-22. 
 92 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2001). 
 93 Some provisions of the 1952 Act were enacted in response to the Supreme 
Court decisions that restricted certain patent law principles.  See supra note 91.  For 
example, the invalidation of “means plus function” which resulted from the 
Halliburton decision was overturned with the enactment of § 112.  CHISUM ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 21-22.  Sections 271(b), (c), and (d) reversed the Supreme Court’s 
broad reading of patent misuse and contributory infringement in Mercoid.  Id.  
Additionally, § 103 implemented an objective standard of nonobviousness which 
removed the synergism requirement set forth in the Great Atlantic decision.  Id. 
 94 The Federal Courts Improvement Act [hereinafter “the Act”] established the 
Federal Circuit.  Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (Apr. 2, 1982).  See generally 
Dennis DeConcini, Symposium Issue: Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 529 (1992).  In an effort to ease 
the enormous caseload burdening the appellate courts of the federal judicial system, 
the Act consolidated the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals under the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.  Id.  The Act also sought to 
achieve national uniformity in the law, particularly in the area of patents.  Id. at 532.  
During the time preceding the promulgation of the Act, patent law was in a state of 
complete disarray.  Id.  Thus, in order to regain consistency in the law and a more 
effective judicial system, the Federal Circuit became the appellate court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from federal district court decisions.  Id. at 
534. 
 95 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. 
 96 Providing a single forum in which patent appeals could be heard improved the 
problems associated with forum shopping.  Id. 
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throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States” for a period of 20 years from the filing date of the 
application.97  In order to receive a patent for an invention, the 
invention must fall within the statutory scope of patentable subject 
matter set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”98  Generally, the claimed 
invention must satisfy the following requirements for patentability: 
novelty,99 nonobviousness,100 and utility.101 
Several threshold issues must be addressed before determining 
whether the invention is patentably distinct from prior art.  Initially, 
one must determine if the invention itself is the kind of invention 
that Congress contemplated as patentable.102  The invention must be 
a “process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,” that is, 
one of the four categories of statutory subject matter articulated in 
section 101.103 
In the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty,104 the Supreme 
Court interpreted these statutory classes broadly to “include anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”105  Chakrabarty sought a patent 
for a genetically engineered bacterium that was capable of degrading 
several components of crude oil.106  The Court noted that naturally 
occurring subject matter generally does not qualify as patentable 
subject matter.107  The Court, however, held that Chakrabarty’s 
genetically engineered bacterium was patentable subject matter, 
because as a result of the inventor’s own work it possessed markedly 
 
 97 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2001). 
 98 Id. at § 101. 
 99 See id. at § 102. 
 100 See id. at § 103. 
 101 See id. at § 101. 
 102 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 728. 
 103 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001); see Karczewski, supra note 4, at 1054 (discussing the 
categories and limits of statutory subject matter and the inclusion of biotechnological 
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different properties from the original bacterium.108  Following this 
line of reasoning, biotechnological inventions may fall within the 
broad scope of patentable subject matter, because scientists go 
through the steps of isolating the gene from other molecules with 
which it is associated in its naturally occurring state.109 
Next, section 112 requires that the claims adequately teach one 
of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use110 the invention and 
to illustrate the best mode111 of the invention.  The claims must be 
definite112 in scope and distinct from all other issued or allowable 
claims.113 
C.  The Requirements of Novelty and Nonobviousness 
Once a patent application satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101 and 112, the claims must also satisfy the novelty requirements 
as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102.114  In general, the PTO will not grant 
patents for inventions that are not new or, in patent law language, 
have been “anticipated by the prior art.”115  To avoid anticipation, the 
invention must not have been known or used by others before the 
date of the invention.116  Also, the inventor will be statutorily barred 
from receiving a patent if an event occurs that triggers section 
102(b).117  For example, the invention must not have been publicly 
used or offered for sale more than a year before the date of filing.118  
Although many refer to section 102 “as a statutory mine field through 
which patent applicants must navigate in order to obtain a patent,” it 
is in place to ensure that patents are awarded to inventors for only 
novel inventions, provided that inventors file their patent 
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applications with diligence.119 
The second hurdle, nonobviousness, prevents a person from 
obtaining patent protection for an invention that could already be 
considered to be in the public domain.120  To satisfy section 103, the 
invention must be different, although not necessarily better, from the 
prior art.121  In Hotchkiss, the inventor sought a patent for substituting 
the metallic knob of a doorknob with a clay or porcelain knob.122  
The Supreme Court denied the patent because of the absence of 
ingenuity on the part of the inventor.123  The Court reasoned that the 
inventor must display some ingenuity or skill beyond that of an 
“ordinary mechanic.”124  This holding essentially created the 
patentability requirement of nonobviousness.125 
D.  The Utility Requirement 
This Comment focuses on the utility requirement for 
patentability, as it applies to patent applications for gene sequences.  
An invention must be useful to be patentable.  The requirement of 
utility is rooted in the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts,” 126 and is currently codified in section 101 
of the Patent Act.127  Judicial interpretation of cases brought before 
the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”),128 largely defines the 
true meaning of this seemingly simple concept.  From the earliest 
interpretation of utility in Lowell v. Davis129 to the modern 
interpretation articulated in Brenner v. Manson,130 the utility 
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requirement is undoubtedly a dynamic standard that continues to be 
redefined as the technological environment of the modern age 
changes. 
Justice Story articulated one of the first interpretations of utility 
in Lowell.131  In 1817, Justice Story applied a de minimis standard to the 
utility requirement.132  He stated that a useful “invention should not 
be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society.”133  This interpretation deemed an invention to be 
useful if it was neither harmful nor immoral to society.134  Based on 
this morality standard, Justice Story also recognized that individuals 
would be able to obtain patents for inventions that were not “useful” 
in a practical sense.135  Justice Story found this acceptable based on 
the reasoning that the “useless” invention “will silently sink into 
contempt and disregard,” bearing little importance or cost to the 
public.136 
Courts followed this low standard for patentability without much 
disruption for nearly 150 years.137  In Brenner v. Manson,138 however, 
the Supreme Court transformed the utility requirement into a more 
meaningful standard for patentability.139  The Court held that a 
chemical process which produced a certain class of compounds was 
not useful under section 101.140  Specifically, the process yielded 
certain steroid compositions which did not possess any tumor-
inhibiting qualities.141  Chemically-related compounds, or 
homologues, however, produced these tumor-inhibiting effects in 
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mice.142  The applicant attempted to obtain a patent for this process 
although he “did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the steroid 
yielded by his process would have similar tumor-inhibiting 
characteristics.”143 
The Patent Office Examiner rejected the patent application for 
failing to disclose the utility associated with the chemical compounds 
produced by the process.144  The CCPA rejected the Examiner’s 
position on utility by concluding that “where a claimed process 
produces a known product[,] it is not necessary to show utility for the 
product, so long as the product is not alleged to be detrimental to the 
public interest.”145 
The Supreme Court enunciated a practical standard for 
determining whether the disclosure of utility was sufficient.  Although 
the Court decided Brenner over thirty years ago, years before the 
technological advances involving recombinant DNA technology, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion echoed concerns that are fully applicable 
to the current issues surrounding gene patents.  Turning its focus 
away from a moral standard for utility, the Court reasoned that the 
nature of chemical inventions demanded a more thoughtful inquiry 
into utility.146  The quid pro quo rationale behind patent legislation is 
to grant an inventor a patent monopoly in exchange for the benefit 
of his useful invention to society.147 
Without knowing the full extent of an invention’s utility, the 
Court opined that the public is threatened with danger by the grant 
of a monopoly that “may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps 
unknowable area.”148  Such a patent has the potential of stifling whole 
areas of scientific development, without providing any real benefit to 
society.149  According to the Court, this is not the type of result 
contemplated by the Framers or by Congress when enacting patent 
legislation.150 Rather, a patentable invention must possess “substantial 
utility” from which society may obtain a specific benefit.151  
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Recognizing the importance of scientific contributions falling short 
of a useful invention, the Court nonetheless clarified that “a patent is 
not a hunting license . . . [nor] a reward for the search, but 
compensation for its successful conclusion.”152 
In the following year, two CCPA decisions, In re Kirk153 and In re 
Joly,154 followed and expanded the “substantial” utility standard 
articulated in Brenner.  Both cases involved patent applications for 
steroidal compounds which the applicants alleged were useful as 
intermediates for preparing other compounds with biological 
properties.155  The CCPA concluded that, for purposes of the utility 
requirement, it is insufficient to assert that a chemical intermediate 
exists and is capable of producing “some intended product of no 
known use.”156  Nor is it sufficient, the court added, to assert that the 
product of the chemical intermediate belongs to a class of 
compounds that may one day be the subject of research to determine 
specific use.157  In the realm of patent legislation, the court noted that 
it is not the responsibility of the public, the PTO, or the courts “to 
play . . . [a] guessing game” in determining the utility of an 
invention.158 
Judge Rich and Judge Smith, the only CCPA judges who had 
patent law experience, offered important dissenting opinions in Kirk 
and Joly.159  Judge Rich, one of the principal drafters of the 1952 
Patent Act, made several cogent observations.160  Judge Rich reviewed 
both the legislative history and court decisions pertaining to the 
meaning of “useful.”161  According to Judge Rich, the term “utility” 
was a prerequisite to patentability from the first patent legislation in 
1790 to the current legislation enacted in 1952.162  Throughout that 
162-year span, there was an absence of legislative history suggesting 
that the utility requirement should be changed.163 
Judge Rich also noted that the Brenner Court could not find 
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assistance in the legislative materials of section 101 which was enacted 
under the 1952 Act.  Judge Rich opined that this was so because “the 
legislature was then taking no action with respect to that provision 
except to reenact it without change, wherefore the true ‘legislative 
materials’ necessarily consist only of its long history of construction 
and repeated reenactment without change.”164  Furthermore, case law 
indicated that “any degree of utility to anybody was legal ‘utility.’”165 
Thus, Congress enacted the present statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, without 
any intention to change the law.166  Judge Rich suggested that the 
majority in Kirk was engaging in judicial law-making, as there was no 
basis in either the legislative history or case law for further raising the 
standards of utility.167 
Judge Rich also criticized the majority’s reliance on the quid pro 
quo philosophy.168  The majority erroneously factored the degree of 
an invention’s utility as part of the quid pro quo of patent system.169  To 
the contrary, Judge Rich pointed out that the degree of utility is not 
of public concern.170  “The only quid pro quo demanded by statute is 
full disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use 
to someone.”171  Judge Rich noted that a patentee has never been 
required to explain the full extent of utility of his invention, most 
often because this is rarely known until years after the invention has 
been made.172 
Lastly, Judge Rich expressed concern regarding the definition of 
“practical,” “substantial,” or “specific” utility and the foreseeable 
administrative problems that may ensue from these “impossible-to-
define” criteria.173  According to Judge Rich, if the problem of 
chemical utility could not be resolved by the courts, Congress should 
address the issue.174  Judge Rich offered his own interpretation of the 
best rule from an administrative standpoint, that all “chemical 
compounds are per se ‘useful’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101 . . 
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. .”175  Judge Rich reasoned that such a rule would encourage 
researchers to develop, disclose, and market new compounds which 
could then be put to experimental use.176  New uses would be 
developed, thereby conferring a benefit to the public by advancing 
the art.177  Judge Smith joined Judge Rich and issued his own 
dissenting opinion in Joly, in which he purported to demonstrate how 
the majority’s opinion “amount[ed] to no less than a usurpation of 
the authority exclusively granted to Congress by Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 
8, of the Constitution.”178 
While Kirk and Joly clearly embraced the more stringent 
interpretation of the utility standard set forth in Brenner, the ruling of 
the CCPA in In re Krimmel initiated the modern trend of liberalizing 
the utility test for pharmaceuticals.179  In that case, the PTO denied a 
patent application for eye medicine.180  Although the applicant 
demonstrated that the medicine worked on rabbits, the PTO and 
Board of Appeals found that use insufficient to satisfy the utility 
requirement.181  The CCPA reversed, holding that that the 
medication was useful for a purpose set forth in the patent 
application.182  The court stated that “one who has taught the public 
that a compound exhibits some desirable pharmaceutical property in 
a standard experimental animal has made a significant and useful 
contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that the 
compound is without value in the treatment of humans.”183 
In 1985, the Federal Circuit examined the “practical utility” 
standard in Cross v. Iizuka.184  This case involved an appeal of an 
interference proceeding185 between parties claiming priority for 
certain imidazole derivative compounds.186  The compounds allegedly 
inhibited the synthesis of thromboxane synthetase, an enzyme 
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implicated in the formation of platelet aggregation.187  On the issue 
of utility, the Federal Circuit held that in vitro188 testing, 
supplemented with in vivo pharmacological activity involving 
structurally similar compounds, was sufficient to establish practical 
utility under § 101.189  The court relied in part on the accepted 
practice of in vitro testing in the pharmaceutical industry as being a 
reasonable predictor of utility in mammals.190 
The Federal Circuit’s more recent decision in In re Brana191 
exemplifies the modern trend of a more relaxed utility standard.  
Applicants appealed the denial of a patent application for anti-tumor 
compounds.192  The PTO based the denial on the fact that the 
application did not identify a specific human disease or condition 
which was treatable by the compounds.193  The claimed agents were, 
however, screened for anti-tumor activity with in vivo testing in 
mice.194  The PTO concluded that in vivo testing in animals was 
insufficient to establish utility for treating cancer in humans.195  In 
essence, the PTO argued that efficacy in animals is not a reasonable 
predictor for utility in treating corresponding human diseases or 
conditions.196  Relying on Krimmel, the Federal Circuit disagreed and 
concluded that the applicant had, in fact, satisfied the utility standard 
through the use of in vivo tests in experimental animals.197  “Title 35 
does not demand that such human testing occur within the confines 
of . . . [the PTO] proceedings.”198  The court noted that approval by 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), in the context of 
pharmaceutical inventions, is not a prerequisite to the utility 
requirement under section 101.199  Moreover, it is expected that these 
types of inventions will require further testing and experimentation 
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before reaching a stage that is useful to humans.200  Requiring 
scientists to prove the advanced stages of utility would stifle 
significant areas of research due to high costs and low incentives to 
discover new inventions.201 
The Federal Circuit articulated its retreat from the CCPA’s 
stringent interpretation of utility, and moved toward the direction of 
Judge Rich’s view in Kirk, by setting forth a two-step analysis for 
determining the utility of an invention.202  First, the PTO has the 
burden of challenging “a presumptively correct assertion of utility in 
the disclosure.”203  Second, “after the PTO provides evidence showing 
that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the 
asserted utility . . . the burden shift[s] to the applicant to provide 
rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the 
invention’s asserted utility.”204  Thus, with the initial burden on the 
PTO to cast doubt based on scientific evidence of an invention’s 
utility, the dynamic utility requirement became less of an 
insurmountable hurdle as it once was before the days of Brenner.205 
In keeping with this more relaxed view of the utility 
requirement, the Federal Circuit recently upheld the validity of a 
patent in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,206 for an invention that 
did not possess a substantial utility.207  Although this case did not 
involve a biotechnological invention, the Juicy Whip opinion 
elucidates the Federal Circuit’s most recent interpretation of the 
utility standard.  The invention claimed was “a post-mix beverage 
dispenser that [was] designed to look like a pre-mix dispenser.”208  
The District Court for the Central District of California concluded 
that the invention lacked utility because it deceived customers and 
increased sales by imitation.209 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.210  In 
articulating the standard for utility, the court stated that “[t]he 
threshold of utility is not high: [a]n invention is ‘useful’ under 
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section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”211  
Under this standard, “[t]he fact that one product can be altered to 
make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.”212  Furthermore, when the 
court addressed public policy concerns regarding deceptive trade 
practices, the court noted that the utility requirement is not a means 
through which the PTO must take on the role of arbiters of deceptive 
trade practices.213  Rather, it is the responsibility of “[o]ther agencies, 
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the [FDA],” to 
protect customers from fraud, deception, or other harms.214  The 
court concluded with the clear assertion that, until it is declared by 
Congress that inventions are unpatentable for reasons such as 
deceptiveness, there is no basis under section 101 to deny these 
inventions patent protection.215  Accordingly, the prevailing view 
deems that any disclosed identifiable benefit satisfies the utility 
requirement and that the PTO has the burden of refuting the 
presumptive presence of such utility. 
III.  THE PATENT “GOLD RUSH” AND THE RAISED UTILITY STANDARDS 
A.  The Rise of Patent Applications for Gene Sequences in the PTO 
After developing a sequencing method that allowed for rapid 
identification of active gene sequences in the human genome,216 the 
NIH quickly sought patent protection for more than three hundred 
of these partial DNA sequences.217  This move by the NIH initiated 
the ongoing debate over whether partial DNA sequences are 
patentable when the sequence alone reveals no information about 
the corresponding full-length gene and its protein function.218  
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Although the NIH apparently did not understand the full biological 
utility of the claimed sequence, it did specify various utilities 
associated with the ESTs.  In particular, the NIH asserted that the 
sequences could serve as probes to differentiate between brain tissue 
and other types of tissue.219  Alternatively, the NIH asserted that the 
sequence could be used to construct oligonucleotides necessary for 
various laboratory techniques.220 
After two rounds of rejection on its initial filing by the PTO, the 
NIH ultimately abandoned its initial efforts toward procuring patent 
protection for EST sequences.221  Their withdrawal, however, did not 
discourage public and private companies from following their lead.222  
Rather, genomics companies and institutions rapidly filed patent 
applications for full or partial gene sequences.223  Some of the most 
active players in the race were Human Genome Sciences,224 InCyte 
Genomics,225 Celera Genomics,226 and the University of California.227  
The PTO issued the first patent for an EST to InCyte 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on October 6, 1998.228  Contrary to the intense 
opposition the NIH faced when it filed its first applications for 
ESTs,229 the PTO issued U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479230 (the ‘479 Patent) 
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with relatively little resistance.231  In particular, the asserted utilities 
specified in the ‘479 Patent apparently satisfied the PTO’s 
requirement for utility, since no rejections based on lack of utility 
were made.232  The ‘479 Patent, entitled “Human Kinase Homologs,” 
differed from the NIH filing in that it did not contain very broad 
claims.233  Rather, the patent claimed forty-four EST sequences that 
could be used to identify novel protein kinases.234  Additionally, the 
PTO Examiner concluded that the ESTs “can be used to generate 
kinase homologs.”235  Although the ‘479 Patent appeared to have 
passed the utility requirement hurdle with relative ease, this was not 
the case for the many EST patent applications that followed.236  The 
issuance of the ‘479 Patent was, however, a clear indication from the 
PTO that under certain circumstances, EST sequences are deemed 
worthy of patent protection.237 
B.  The Utility Examination Guidelines 
In response to the increasing number of patent applications for 
biotechnological inventions, the PTO established Utility Examination 
Guidelines in 1995 (“1995 Guidelines”).238 The 1995 Guidelines 
established a two-pronged inquiry for utility.239  According to the 
inquiry, the invention had to assert a utility that was “specific” and 
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 234 U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (issued Oct. 6, 1998).  For further discussion on the 
InCyte patent, see Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 770-71. 
 235 Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 561 (quotations in original). 
 236 See Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 771 (explaining how the InCyte patent 
is distinguishable from other EST patents because the sequences are “all from a 
known protein family (kinases) with a known function (signaling)”). 
 237 Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 560. 
 238 Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36323 (July 14, 1995) 
[hereinafter Utility Examination Guidelines II]. 
 239 J. Timothy Meigs, Biotechnology Patent Prosecution in View of PTO’s Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 458-59 (2001). 
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“credible” to satisfy the utility requirement.240  To assess “specific” 
utility, patent Examiners need to determine whether a particular 
purpose for the invention was clearly articulated.241  Credibility, on 
the other hand, was demonstrated if one of ordinary skill in the art 
would have been convinced of the asserted utility based on all of the 
facts and reasoning provided in each case.242 
The Commissioner of the PTO, Bruce Lehman, explained that 
the 1995 Guidelines reflected the PTO’s position that proper 
deference should be accorded to the experts in the field of 
biotechnology.243  In reviewing patent applications, the role of patent 
Examiners was very clear—to evaluate the credibility of an asserted 
utility.244  This approach was a far cry from the “substantial” utility 
approach articulated in Brenner.  It appeared that the PTO adopted a 
highly deferential, rubber stamp approach for the determination of 
an invention’s utility.245  The public quickly criticized the 1995 
Guidelines because the guidelines did not require a showing of 
“substantial” utility.246  Thus, the 1995 Guidelines had the practical 
effect of lowering the utility requirement or “propping open the 
‘door’ to section 101,”247 which was indicative of the PTO’s implicit 
acceptance over the patenting of EST sequences.248 
The PTO modified their position once again on January 5, 2001 
when it published the current, revised version of the Guidelines.249  
 
 240 Id. at 459.  More specifically, the Guidelines instructed patent Examiners not 
to reject an application for lack of utility “[i]f the applicant has asserted that the 
claimed invention is useful for any particular purpose . . . and that assertion would be 
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . .”  Utility Examination 
Guidelines II, supra note 238. 
 241 See Meigs, supra note 239, at 460. 
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 243 See Knight, supra note 39, at 1015. 
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 246 Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 559 (“Critics of the PTO guidelines [were] 
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Prior to publication, the PTO issued Interim Guidelines and 
requested comments from the public. 250  The Interim Guidelines 
differed from the 1995 Guidelines by restoring the Brenner rationale 
and adding the requirement of “substantial” utility.251  The PTO 
received comments from seventeen organizations and thirty-five 
individuals.252  Most comments approved of the incorporation of a 
“substantial” utility requirement along with the shift toward the 
stringent interpretation of utility.253  It was apparent that the industry 
had the same concerns regarding overbroad patent protection for 
partial length gene sequences that were expressed ten years earlier, 
when the NIH filed the first applications for ESTs.254 
Under the revised Guidelines, a biotechnological invention must 
possess a “well-established utility.”255  This can be established if the 
utility is “specific, substantial, and credible.”256  The standard for 
credibility has not varied greatly from the standard set forth in the 
1995 Guidelines.257  “Credibility is assessed from the perspective of 
one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosure and any other 
evidence of record.”258  The main difference lies in the “specific” and 
“substantial” utility prongs of the test.259 
The scope of a “specific” utility has expanded under the new 
Guidelines.260  Contrary to the liberal standard for “specific” utility 
adopted in the 1995 Guidelines,261 an inventor must do more than 
clearly assert a particular purpose for the invention.262  Under the 
new Guidelines, the utility must be specific to the claimed subject 
matter.263  This means that an asserted utility as a gene probe, for 
example, would only be acceptable if a specific DNA target is 
 
 250 Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71440 (Dec. 21, 
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Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 97 
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 261 See supra text accompanying note 241. 
 262 See Kunin, supra note 257, at 96-99. 
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disclosed.264  Similarly, a diagnostic utility would be considered a 
specific utility only if a specific disease or condition is likewise 
disclosed.265  Under this standard, generalized utilities, such as the 
utilities asserted in Kirk, would be grounds for rejection under section 
101. 
The last hurdle under the new Guidelines is the “substantial” 
utility requirement.  Although the PTO does not clearly define 
“substantial” utility, the Guidelines suggest that the invention must 
have a real world use.266  The amount of additional research required 
to yield an immediate benefit is one factor toward the determination 
of whether an invention has real world use.267  “Throw-away” utilities, 
such as the use as ballast or “the use of a complex invention as a 
landfill,” are insufficient to meet this requirement.268  By requiring 
the invention to possess a real world benefit, the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Brenner has once again become the standard for utility in 
the PTO.  If an inventor fails to show “well-established” utility, the 
patent Examiner would reject the claims under section 101.269  Thus, 
partial length gene sequences are deemed unpatentable if the 
asserted uses for the sequence fall short of the Brenner-like standard 
incorporated in the current Guidelines. 
C.  The Practical Effect of the “Credible, Specific, and Substantial” 
Utility Standard 
The critical issue regarding the new Guidelines is the actual 
effect the raised utility standard has on patent applications.  The 
Guidelines do not clearly delineate a bright line standard between a 
substantial and a non-substantial utility.  Rather, every patent 
Examiner is provided with instructions in the form of training 
materials that assist them in making utility determinations.270  For 
example, in the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training 
Materials, the synopsis states, “It is . . . assumed that some ‘utility’ is 
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disclosed in the specification or is recognized to be well-established in 
the art.  The Examiner should determine whether any asserted utility 
is specific and substantial, and if so, determine whether such asserted 
utility is credible.”271  Actual examples of claim rejections based on 
lack of utility under section 101 help to clarify this general 
instruction. 
In the first example, a patent application claimed specific 
nucleic acid compounds which purported to encode a certain type of 
protein.272  During prosecution, the Examiner rejected the claims 
because the “nucleic acids [were] not supported by a specific asserted 
utility because the disclosed uses of the nucleic acids are not specific 
and are generally applicable to any nucleic acid.”273  Specifically, the 
Examiner ultimately arrived at the following conclusion: 
[N]o substantial utility has been established for the claimed 
subject matter.  For example, any nucleic acid can produce a 
protein.  The protein could then be used in conducting research 
to functionally characterize the protein.  The need for such 
research clearly indicates that the protein and/or function is not 
disclosed as to a currently available or substantial utility.  A 
starting material that can only be used to produce a final product 
does not have a substantial asserted utility in those instances 
where the final product is not supported by a specific and 
substantial utility.274 
In response to the rejection, the applicant asserted that the 
claimed invention did possess a well-established utility.275  The 
applicant noted that the claimed sequences comprised certain 
functional and structural features, which were intrinsic to the family 
of genes that encoded this specific class of proteins.276  Furthermore, 
the applicant stated that the sequences were useful in selecting and 
making oligomers for a gene-chip assay which would aid in 
monitoring the expression levels of these proteins.277  
Notwithstanding these asserted utilities, the Examiner maintained the 
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rejections under section 101.278 
A similar rejection was sustained in a second patent application 
where the claimed invention involved another class of proteins and 
the polynucleotides encoding them.279  The Examiner rejected the 
claims because “none of the proteins that are to be produced as final 
products resulting from processes involving claimed nucleic acid have 
asserted or identified specific and substantial utilities.”280  
Furthermore, the Examiner noted that the “non-specific uses 
[asserted] . . . are applicable to proteins in general and [are] not 
particular or specific to nucleic acid(s) and/or protein(s) being 
claimed.”281  In response, the applicant indicated specific ways in 
which the encoded proteins could be used.282  The applicant noted 
that the novel proteins are capable of inducing biological activities 
such as bone, cartilage, or connective tissue formation.283  The 
proteins could also be used for increasing the activity of additional 
bone morphogenetic proteins.284  Additionally, the invention 
possesses a well-established utility as a research tool that is used in 
characterizing an important class of human proteins with which it 
shares significant structural and functional similarities.285  Thus, 
contrary to the Examiner’s basis for rejection, the applicant 
illustrated ways in which these utilities would not be shared by any 
general protein.  Whether these assertions are enough to overcome 
the utility rejections is yet to be determined. 
IV.  LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE NEW UTILITY GUIDELINES 
As the federal agency responsible for the administration of 
patent laws,286 the PTO plays a crucial role in the granting of patent 
rights for inventions that are truly worthy of protection.  The 
responsibility of differentiating between patentable and non-
patentable inventions has become a more challenging task due to the 
unique nature of gene sequences.  It is clear that gene patent 
applications must be handled with caution.  DNA patentability 
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invokes concerns such as the distortion of research priorities, stifled 
scientific research, the potential for increased licensing complexity 
and costs, and costly ownership disputes.287  Undoubtedly, 
researchers should be rewarded for their efforts to identify potentially 
useful sequences.  Because of the implications arising from gene 
patents, however, their reward should be commensurate with the 
benefit received from the disclosure of the sequence.  The raised 
utility standard illustrates the PTO’s attempt to resolve these issues. 
It is clear that the PTO does not have unfettered discretion on 
these matters.  The Federal Circuit clearly stated that “[t]he 
Guidelines, like the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(“MPEP”) are not binding on th[e] court, but may be given judicial 
notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute.”288  The 
PTO is bound by the laws that Congress enacted and the judicial 
interpretation of such laws.289  An analysis of the current state of the 
law suggests that the “credible, specific and substantial” utility 
standard demands a showing of utility beyond what Congress 
intended. 
Although the current guidelines may appear to be consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Brenner, the facts of that case 
suggest that the Court did not intend to create a raised utility 
standard that is applicable to all inventions.290  Rather, as Judge Rich 
noted in his dissent in Kirk, the facts of Brenner must be distinguished 
from other cases addressing the utility requirement.291  In particular, 
Brenner involved an interference proceeding where the main issue 
focused on Manson’s supporting affidavits which failed to disclose 
any utility for the compounds that resulted from his claimed 
process.292  This was distinguishable from the circumstances in Kirk, 
where there was “admitted disclosure of utility of the compounds as 
 
 287 See Daniel R. Kimball, Patenting Genes: Risks and Rewards vs. Politics and Policies, 
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intermediates to make certain steroids.”293 
Furthermore, decisions by the Federal Circuit in cases following 
Brenner articulate a return to the low pre-Brenner utility standard, 
which generally posed no obstacle to those seeking patent protection 
for their inventions.  Thus, it appears that the PTO has arbitrarily 
raised the bar for the utility standard, by imposing Guidelines that 
adhere to the stringent interpretation of the utility standard when 
there is an absence of legislative history suggesting that inventions 
must show a higher degree of utility to be patentable. 
By judging patent applications against the “specific, substantial, 
and credible” utility standard, the PTO is effectively denying patents 
to inventions that should receive patent protection.  The PTO has 
exceeded its authority by rejecting patent applications for inventions 
that possess sufficient utility under the current legal standard of 
utility and by demanding the “specific, substantial, and credible” 
utility under the Guidelines.  The PTO is not authorized to engage in 
legislative and judicial rulemaking by substituting their judgment for 
utility in place of Congress and the judiciary.  The ultra vires actions 
may cause substantial damage to applicants who wish to share the 
benefits of their research, but with the quid pro quo of a patent. 
This Comment proposes that the PTO remove the requirement 
of a “credible, specific, and substantial” utility.  Because the term 
“substantial” was used throughout the Brenner decision, the PTO 
incorporated “substantial utility” into the Guidelines.  What 
constitutes “substantial utility,” however, is a matter that is defined by 
the Brenner decision, the legislative history of the utility requirement 
under section 101,294 and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of utility 
as discussed in cases following Brenner.  Injustice may result when 
“substantial” is interpreted to mean a certain degree of utility.  As 
Judge Rich explained in his dissent in Kirk, section 101 does not 
require a specific degree of utility for patentability.295  Any degree of 
utility, and not an absence of utility as was the case in Brenner, would 
satisfy the requirement.296  As a practical matter, much additional 
time and expense would be required to reach conclusions as to how a 
specific encoded protein would act biologically. 
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A.  Judge Giles S. Rich: A Closer Look at Brenner and the Legislative 
History of the Utility Requirement 
Given his significant involvement in drafting the 1952 Patent 
Act, his longevity on the bench, and his stature as a jurist, significant 
attention must be paid to the observations made by Judge Rich in his 
dissenting opinion in Kirk, which support a lower standard of utility 
under section 101.297  In its entirety, Judge Rich’s dissenting opinion 
articulates rationale for not extending the “substantial” utility 
requirement beyond the facts of Brenner.298  Judge Rich began by 
noting that Brenner was factually distinguishable from Kirk, and 
therefore was not controlling.299  In particular, “the distinction which 
must be borne in mind is that between some disclosure of utility and 
none.”300  Judge Rich observed that Manson’s patent application and 
supporting affidavits did not disclose any utility for the products of 
his claimed process.301  This was a significant distinction from the 
patent in Kirk, where there was admitted disclosure of utility for the 
compounds, namely as intermediates in the preparation of certain 
steroids.302  Based on the premise accepted by Judge Rich, that “any 
degree of utility, however slight, complies with the requirement that 
an invention be ‘useful,’” the invention in Kirk should have been 
found to possess sufficient utility as a chemical intermediate.303  This 
is distinct from Manson’s invention, which Judge Rich agreed did not 
possess sufficient utility, because no utility was asserted for the 
compounds produced by the claimed process.304 
Judge Rich continued his analysis by discussing the absence of 
legislative history in support of the majority’s ruling in Kirk.305  He 
traced the evolution of the statutes, beginning with the 1790 Patent 
Act, up to the current statute, the Patent Act of 1952.306  He stated 
that the identical term “useful” was used in each statute to describe 
one of the requirements for patentability.307  Furthermore, Judge 
Rich observed that the term “useful” was consistently interpreted by 
courts to mean that “any degree of utility to anybody was legal 
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‘utility.’”308  Because there was no indication that Congress intended 
to change the utility requirement, Judge Rich argued that the 
Supreme Court in Brenner did not intend to overturn nearly 200 years 
of established law by demanding an assertion of “substantial” utility 
for all inventions seeking patent protection.309 
Turning his focus to public policy, Judge Rich criticized the quid 
pro quo philosophy relied upon by the majority in support of 
requiring “substantial” utility for patentability.310  Judge Rich 
reasoned that “[t]he only quid pro quo demanded by the statute is full 
disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use to 
someone.”311  An invention that lacks utility will ultimately be of little 
value to the patent holder.312  Thus, the public should not be 
concerned with the specific degree of utility possessed by the 
invention.  Judge Rich explained that as a practical matter, the full 
extent of utility is often unknown, as uses generally evolve after 
inventions are disclosed to the public.313  Based on this reasoning, 
“substantial” utility plays no role in the quid pro quo equation of patent 
law.  Rather it is disclosure of the invention to the public that the 
inventor must exchange for a government-granted monopoly over 
the invention. 
Judge Rich’s quid pro quo analysis, however, may not be as 
persuasive an argument in this context because of the nature of 
human genes.  In a situation where an inventor is granted a patent 
for a minimally useful invention, Judge Rich suggested that the 
patent will correspondingly be of minimal value to the inventor 
because the patentee generally will not receive any commercial 
benefit from the public.314  This argument holds true for individual, 
self-standing inventions, such as those in the mechanical or electrical 
arts, because their existence is independent of other potential 
inventions. 
Such is not always the case, however, with regard to gene 
sequences.  There are a finite number of genes in the human 
genome.315  Staking claims to portions of the human genome can 
have serious ramifications, particularly when the full extent of their 
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biological activity is unknown.  Patents covering gene sequences that 
form a portion of a full gene have the potential of stifling scientific 
research.316  Where their target gene of interest encompasses a 
patented sequence, molecular biologists now have to worry about 
whether they are infringing on someone’s patent.  This concern, 
however, must be balanced against the right of an inventor to reap 
the benefits of his research in a pioneer field.  Utility will always be an 
issue when a new class of compounds with unique properties is 
discovered.  Demanding a higher standard of utility, however, is 
unwarranted and penalizes the pioneer industry.  Future researchers 
will have to tread more lightly in the face of broad pioneering 
patents.  The fact that later researchers must be more wary is an 
insufficient basis for the PTO to substantially modify a key 
requirement for patentability.  Rather, it suggests that any such action 
should be undertaken by Congress after an appropriate study.317  
Alternatively, the issue should be brought to the public’s attention 
and opened up for public discussion or debate. 
 
 
 316 Gene patents have been the subject of controversy for many members of the 
scientific community.  One example is the lawsuit involving the University of 
Rochester (“the University”) against the pharmaceutical company, G.D. Searle.  See 
Regalado, supra note 223.  The University claims that Searle’s painkiller drug, 
Celebrex, infringes on the patent it holds over the Cox-2 gene.  Id.  The lawsuit has 
been described as a tactical measure by the University to coerce Searle into paying 
royalties.  Id.  If royalties are not paid by Searle, the University demands that the drug 
be removed from the market, regardless of the fact that it is used by approximately 
seven million arthritis sufferers.  Id.  Another example is the lawsuit involving the 
commercial genetic test for the Canavan disease, a neurological disorder affecting 
Ashkenazi Jewish children.  See American Medical Association, Gene Patent Leads to 
Legal Action, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/3358.html 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2001).  The Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) owns a patent 
over the gene causing the disease.  Id.  The lawsuit focuses on the MCH decision to 
enforce a licensing fee for every test performed.  Id.  The lawsuit seeks to prevent 
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Several members of the field expressed the need for reform over gene patents, 
including Michael S. Watson, chair of the patent subcommittees of the American 
College of Medical Genetics and professor at the Washington University School of 
Medicine.  See Douglas Steinberg, Biotech Faces Evolving Patent System, THE SCIENTIST 
14[5]:8, available at http://www.the-scientist.com (Mar. 6, 2000) (on file with 
author).  Watson conducted a survey over board-certified professionals in molecular 
diagnostics.  Id.  Based on the responses, forty-one percent felt that patents negatively 
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from pursuing a scientific interest because of patents.  Id. 
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B.  The Decisions of the Federal Circuit Clearly Articulate a Low 
Standard for Utility 
Although the Federal Circuit has not specifically ruled on the 
degree of utility required for biotechnological inventions, the court 
recently articulated in very clear terms the degree of utility required 
for inventions generally.  In Juicy Whip, the Federal Circuit took the 
position that “[t]he threshold for utility is not high.”318  Rather, 
under section 101 of the Patent Act, an invention simply must be 
capable of providing an identifiable benefit.319  Interestingly, while 
the Federal Circuit cited Brenner in support of its rationale, the 
phrase “substantial” utility is not mentioned at any point in the 
opinion. 
Although the patent in Juicy Whip involved a type of beverage 
dispenser, an invention far from the complexity of biotechnological 
inventions, the court’s rationale for finding sufficient utility is 
nonetheless applicable to gene patents.  The Federal Circuit focused 
on the public policy concern of patenting inventions which could be 
used to defraud or deceive.320  The court explicitly rejected the 
notion that such a possibility could deprive an invention of utility.321  
The Juicy Whip decision further noted that there are protections in 
place to address these concerns, namely administrative agencies such 
as the FTC and FDA.322  Thus, it is outside the province of the 
judiciary and the PTO to protect society from such harm by denying 
patent protection. 
The court concluded that “Congress is free to declare particular 
types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including 
deceptiveness . . . .  Until such time as Congress does so, however, we 
find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled 
unpatentable for lack of utility.”323  This highly deferential position 
afforded to Congress, in combination with the less stringent utility 
standard followed by the Federal Circuit in its decisions following 
Brenner, make it likely that the PTO is acting in an ultra vires manner 
by incorporating a “substantial” utility requirement in its guidelines.  
The Federal Circuit has clearly articulated that modification of the 
utility standard is a matter that is best addressed by Congress, rather 
than by the courts. 
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In the recent Federal Circuit decision, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe Inc.,324 the court addressed an analogous patentability issue 
relating to the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 
112.325  The invention involved nucleic acid probes that were used for 
selective hybridization with the genetic material of gonorrhea-causing 
bacteria.326  To fulfill the written description requirement, Enzo 
Biochem (“Enzo”) deposited the claimed nucleotide sequences in a 
public depository.327  Enzo argued that the reference to the deposit in 
the specification inherently described the invention, thereby 
satisfying the section 112 requirement.328  The defendant, however, 
argued that this reference was insufficient for purposes of section 
112, and the patent was thus invalid.329 
Noting its departure from existing precedent, the court held 
that the written description requirement was met.  The court 
concluded that “reference in the specification to a deposit in a public 
depository, which makes its contents accessible to the public when it 
is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an adequate 
description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the 
written description requirement of section 112, paragraph 1.”330  The 
court considered the history of the practice of depositing biological 
materials, the general goals of the patent system, and the “practical 
difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a written 
description.”331 
This decision supports the policy argument that can be made in 
the case of the utility requirement.  By focusing on these factors, the 
court placed great weight on the practical considerations associated 
with scientific research.  Private and public institutions make huge 
expenditures to arrive at the discoveries that promote the well-being 
of humans.  The general goal of promoting the progress of science 
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can be realistically achieved if researchers are financially stable 
enough to continue research efforts.  Researchers rely on the 
protection granted by patents to proceed with endeavors, some of 
which do not produce a profitable result. 
The court in Enzo Biochem realized that, although the court may 
have previously considered a reference to deposit as insufficient for 
purposes of the written description requirement, circumstances exist 
in the realm of biotechnological research which justify the opposite 
result.  What is important is the fact that the public had access to the 
claimed materials.  Similar circumstances exist with gene sequences.  
Although the full utility of the gene sequence may not be known, 
scientists rely on patent protection to continue the research that may 
ultimately unveil the full utility of the gene.  In the meantime, the 
information that is known is made available to the public, and the 
public is able to partake in similar research efforts with the hopes of 
uncovering the gene’s full utility. 
C.  Proposed Resolution: Utility Analysis for Gene Patents332 
The foregoing analysis discusses three guiding principles that 
help define the current law regarding the utility requirement for 
patentability.  First, the Supreme Court in Brenner clearly articulated 
that an invention is deemed to have substantial utility “where specific 
benefit exists in currently available form.”333  Thus, patents should 
not issue for inventions that possess no utility at all—such as steroidal 
compositions whose homologues, as opposed to the steroid itself, 
 
 332 A number of alternative measures have been offered by commentators in the 
field.  See, e.g., Zuhn, supra note 128, at 995-98 (discussing proposals set forth by 
commentators on EST patentability, including the adoption of a per se utility standard 
for chemical compounds, the application of copyright laws in place of patent laws for 
DNA sequences, the alteration of statutory subject matter categories, and applying a 
“prospective” utility requirement).  One argument is that Congress should create a 
separate intellectual property system for biotechnological inventions, as Congress 
once did for two other areas of technology, namely semiconductor chip masks and 
plant varieties.  See id. at 996.  The PTO, however, has suggested that such a need for 
a specialized patent law system is unnecessary.  See John J. Doll, supra note 42 
(arguing that similar concerns over gene patenting were used thirty to forty years ago 
with emerging polymer chemistry technology, which developed without the need for 
a new form of intellectual property).  John J. Doll, Director of Biotechnology for the 
PTO, noted that the same patentability analysis must be performed for every patent 
application, regardless of the nature of the invention.  Id.  “In every field of 
technology — whether emerging, complex, or competitive — all the conditions for 
patentability (such as statutory subject matter, utility, enablement, written 
description, novelty, and non-obviousness) must be met before a claim is allowed.”  
Id. at 689-90.  Thus, there is no need for the creation of an entirely separate system 
for DNA sequences applications. 
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showed tumor-inhibiting effects in mice.  Second, based on the 
absence of legislative history suggesting that the utility doctrine 
requires a higher standard for utility, an invention need only possess 
some type of utility, rather than a specific degree of utility.  Third, the 
Federal Circuit articulated in its recent decisions that inventions need 
only meet a relatively low threshold for utility.  Thus, an invention 
must be capable of providing only an identifiable benefit to satisfy the 
utility requirement of section 101. 
The Guidelines for determining adequate utility to be used by 
the PTO during prosecution should be based on these three 
principles.  The current Guidelines have the effect of requiring a 
certain degree of utility be present for the claimed sequences.  The 
language cited in the PTO Training Materials illustrates this concept: 
“It is . . . assumed that some ‘utility’ is disclosed in the specification or 
is recognized to be well-established in the art.  The Examiner should 
determine whether any asserted utility is specific and substantial, and 
if so, determine whether such asserted utility is credible.”334  To be in 
accordance with the law, a standard which provides that “some 
‘utility’ . . . disclosed in the specification” be present should plainly 
satisfy the requirements under section 101.335  By these standards, a 
nucleic acid sequence, with a disclosed utility as a research tool for 
investigation of a specific family of human proteins, should satisfy the 
utility Guidelines.  Although later researchers may need to exercise 
due care to avoid infringement conflicts, this is always an issue in a 
viable patent system.  It is not the role of the PTO to police 
enforcement of patents.  Rather, the authority to change 
fundamental patent standards lies with Congress.  Until changes are 
made, the PTO is responsible for granting patents for inventions that 
meet the patentability requirements enacted by Congress and 
interpreted by the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is left to the imagination whether the Framers envisioned the 
type of inventions that seek patent protection today.  What is known, 
however, is that there is a pressing need to determine the proper 
standards for granting patents for advances in technology.  Little 
guidance can be found in the sources of patent law.  With the rise of 
recombinant DNA technology, inventions composed of DNA 
emerged.  Common sense indicates that limited monopolies over 
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these portions of DNA should be granted only with a fair quid pro quo; 
a satisfaction of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112, 102, and 103.  These sections 
of the Patent Act adequately protect the public from inventions that 
are not worthy of protection.  There is no need to tamper with the 
utility standards enunciated by the courts and previously adopted by 
the PTO.  Without any overt legislative action taken by Congress, 
however, the PTO took the initiative of denying patent protection for 
biotechnological inventions with identifiable utility by issuing stricter 
Utility Examination Guidelines.  The PTO essentially raised the utility 
hurdle for which an invention must pass.  In light of the actual 
holding of Brenner, the Federal Circuit decisions following Brenner, 
and the congressional silence on the matter, the PTO lacks the 
authority to substantially alter one of the fundamental requirements 
of patentability.  Thus, the PTO is acting outside its scope of authority 
by denying patent protection for inventions that do not meet its 
raised utility standard. 
